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"If such a shoe exists, the parties have not pointed to it, there is
no evidence that Already has dreamt of it, and we cannot conceive
of it.It sits, as far as we can tell, on a shelf between Dorothy's
ruby slippers andPerseus'swinged sandals.
INTRODUCTION

Suppose you have developed an idea-made an intangible knowledge
object. 2 Whether the idea is a work of art, a widget, or the very branding of
your particular product or service, you have invested considerable energy
and resources into this work and it has consumed much of your working
life. Then, just as you are about to reap the fruits of your labor, someone
says that your idea is actually theirs. Not only is it theirs, but you cannot
use it because an intellectual property regime-be it patent,3 trademark,4 or

1. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 728 (2013).
2.
The term "intangible knowledge object" or "knowledge object" is used in this article to denote a discrete unit of intellectual property but is not limited to knowledge per se,
but rather encompasses expressive works, source designators (marks), and inventions. The
term is derived from the contrasting notion that property rights analogous to those relating to
tangible objects-chattel or real property-may also relate to an intangible "object" such as
knowledge. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 83-84 n.2, 285 (2004),
available at http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf (comparing physical and intangible
types of property and characterizing works licensed under the creative commons as "objects").
3. For the purposes of this Article the term "patent" will refer to utility patents, which
protect inventions, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (9th ed. 2011), rather than design
patents, which protect ornamental design that has no functional purpose, see id. at 1235.
4. Trademarks can be protected under both state and federal laws and may be protected without registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2014); D C Comics, Inc. v. Powers, 465 F. Supp.
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copyrights-protects it. 6 If, for reasons of price, principle, or possibility,
you refuse to abandon your work or license the right to use it, then you
have two remaining courses of action: (1) proceed with your work, await a
lawsuit, and then counterclaim for invalidity and non-infringement; or (2)
file for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement before
continuing too far. The latter option is far preferable to a putative defendant. Beyond the exhausting costs of litigation, the pendency of an infringement suit hangs like a Damoclean Sword. Having placed the wouldbe defendant on notice of their alleged infringement, the intellectual property holder is free to let the putative infringer "run up [the] bill."8 In the
event of finding infringement wherein the infringer had notice of his infringement, a court could find the infringement willful thereby allowing the
plaintiff to reap up to treble damages. 9 Instead, it may be better to attack
the claim head-on and adjudicate the rights of the parties before damages
can pile up. But whether you, a putative infringer, can get into court depends on your accuser's actions.
"Trolls" are a common phenomenon that plagues the intellectual property sphere.1 0 Like storybook villains exacting tolls from unwary passersby
for use of a bridge that is rightly open to the public, these entities file costly
843 (S.D.N.Y.1978). For the purposes of this Article, trademarks will refer to those registered with the federal government and protected under the Lanham Act.
5.
Although copyright protection is obtained at the moment of fixation of an original
work of authorship, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561
(1973) (interpreting the fixation requirement to pertain to "any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor"), the registration of a work, within certain
time constraints, permits the copyright holder to seek statutory damages and attorney's fees.
17 U.S.C. § 412. For the purposes of this Article, works characterized as "copyrighted" will
refer to a work that is registered and certified by the Copyright Office.
6.
Trade secret protections will not be addressed in this Article because trade secret
rights neither confer a monopoly nor is independent discovery, creation, or invention by a
second party actionable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a-b
(1995).
7.
Although the Sword of Damocles originally represented the great danger that accompanies a life of great power and apparent comfort, the term has come to mean, and in
this Article is used to indicate, impending doom. 'Sword Of Damocles' Reference Sometimes

Misused,

NATIONAL

PUBLIC

RADIO

(Aug.

19,

2011),

http://www.npr.org/2011/08/19/139799434/sword-of-damocles-reference-sometimesmisused.
8. DeclaratoryJudgments: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 5623, 70th Cong. 35 (1928) (statement of Prof. E. R. Sunderland).
9.
15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 504; 35 U.S.C. § 284.
10.
See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, NEW
YORK TMVIES (Jul. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-willsue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html.

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BREEF

Vol. 6:2

suits against putative infringers, often wielding weak claims and seeking a
quick payout.1 This method is so effective at obtaining settlements and
licensing agreements that the plaintiffs are often neither originators nor
practitioners of the relevant intellectual property, but merely entities
formed to acquire patents and wield them as swords in litigation. 12 When
challenged by a defendant with a counterclaim for invalidity, the practice is
commonly to execute a covenant not to sue whereby the defendant is relieved of liability for their infringement, mooting the defendant's counterclaim of invalidity, and leaving the weaponized intellectual property right
intact and thus available for use in subsequent litigation.13 This is not to
say that every intellectual property right is invalid, or the accused technology, work, or mark is not an infringement. Although this litigation strategy
is identified widely with mercenary practices in the intellectual property
sphere, "legitimate" intellectual property holders also use it to great success. 14 But even in cases of "legitimate," as opposed to troll, litigation,15
these practices undermine the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
warp the case and controversy requirement, and leave intellectual16property
disputes that are appropriate and ripe for adjudication unresolved.
The case of Already v. Nike 17 exemplifies the problems that the practice
of adopting covenants that moot any counterclaims for invalidity pose to
litigants and industries dependent on intellectual property rights, and, more
importantly, illuminates the structural defects in how courts treat these
questions-a treatment that permits and incentivizes this strategy. In this
11.
See e.g., Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REv. 53, 59 (2014); This American Life: When Patents Attack!, CHICAGO PUBLIC
RADIO (July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/whenpatents-attack.
12. Id.

13.

Brief of Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at

17-18, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (No. 11-982).
14.
See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an EmpiricalStudy, 100 IOWA L. REv. 1105.
1114-15 (2014); Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standardfor Evaluating Patent Litigants' Access to the DeclaratoryJudgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 407,
426 n.98 (2006) (discussing a variety of cases mooted by various covenants).

15.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202; see Vangelis Economou, Sacking Super Sack: Using Ex-

isting Rules to Prevent Patenteesfrom Fleeing an Improvident Patent Infringement Lawsuit,
8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 90, 120 n.292 (2009) (discussing the persistence of an
actual controversy beyond a covenant not to sue and the variation of courts' exercise of ju-

risdiction).
16.
See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluating DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction in
Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 83 IND. L. J. 957, 959 (2008) (observing that a warped juris-

dictional analysis in intellectual property disputes has the effect of under-including cases).
17.

133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
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case, Nike filed suit alleging that shoes produced by Already infringed on
Nike's "Air Force 1" registered trademark.1 8 Approximately four months
later, Already counterclaimed that the registration was invalid and, four
months after that, the parties signed a covenant not to sue for any past, present, or planned acts which may have been infringing.19 Already pressed
on with their counterclaim for invalidity asserting that, in the absence of a
total covenant, the issue of the mark's validity was not moot. 20 The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, essentially construing the covenant to
have only failed to cover an impossible shoe of which the Court could not
conceive. 21 The Court extended the tests that form the basis of courts' declaratory judgment jurisdictional analysis and determined that, despite the
covenant's explicit exception regarding future acts, the counterclaimant
could have no reasonable basis to be apprehensive of future litigation.22
This restrictive reading of what constitutes a live case and controversy
echoes the evolution of courts' tests when considering jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions. This evolution has steadily undermined the
purpose of declaratory judgments since the enactment of the Declaratory
Judgment Act in 1934.23 Over time, courts' interpretations of the requirements of the statute, and the application of the Article III "case and controversy" requirement, regarding intellectual property disputes has grown
more stringent, thwarting the purpose of the act and impermissibly restricting standing under Article III.24 This Article will argue that, in intellectual
property disputes, the courts have imposed jurisdictional barriers to a declaratory-plaintiff, or a counterclaimant, that impermissibly and improperly
construe the requirements of Article III. These requirements further contravene the express will of Congress in passing the Declaratory Judgment
Act-the proper standard in such cases is the irreducible case and controversy requirement.
To better understand the origins of the courts' misapplication of the case
and controversy requirement in this context, Part 0 explicates the goals and
18. Id.at 725.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 725-26 (reciting the history of the case before the Court).
21. Id. at 728.
22. Id. at 732.
23.
See de Larena, supra note 16, at 959 (characterizing the situations before the Declaratory Judgment Act and under the Federal Circuit's declaratory jurisdiction tests as a
"danse macabre").
24. See Lisa A. Dolak, DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdictionin Patent Cases: Restoring
the Balance between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REv. 903, 925
(1997) (marking the divergence in courts' treatment of the jurisdictional tests of patent cases).
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legal framework of the United States' intellectual property protection regime. The operations and purposes of the rights granted under these
schemes gave rise to a series of incentives for patent, trademark, and copyright holders, the effects of which inform the purpose and intended function
of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Part 0 addresses the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act and demonstrates the departure of courts from that
intent. The fundamental principles of standing and mootness, which the
above subjects directly implicate, are discussed in Parts 0 and 0 respectively and, in so doing, this Article demonstrates that courts should understand
the tests of declaratory standing and counterclaim mootness to be intimately linked. Taken together, the case and controversy requirement, the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the mootness inquiry, and the nature of intellectual property rights form a framework to analyze courts'
treatment of standing and mootness in intellectual property disputes. Part 0
draws a comparison between courts' practices in more traditional avenues
of litigation and intellectual property disputes. This comparison reveals the
disparate application of the standing analysis between these subject matters. Parts 0 and 0 argue that the differences in these inquiries are improper
constructions of the Declaratory Judgment Act and impermissible readings
of the Article III requirements. Furthermore, Parts II.A and II.B propose
that courts should inquire into the standing of parties and the mootness of
counterclaims in intellectual property disputes using the framework developed above, thereby resolving the issue.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The Purposesand Legal Framework of Intellectual Property
Although the world of intellectual property is often divided
into four parts-patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret-this
Article deals only with the first three because, although all four receive certain legal protections, unlike trade secrets, the rights at issue
under the first three regimes can be registered and the government
affirmatively grants monopolistic property rights.2 5

25.

See, e.g.,

CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,

COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & TRADE SECRETS § 10:1

(Thomson Reuters ed., 2013);

J. STERNSTEIN

SERIES:

ET AL.,

CORPORATE

COMPLIANCE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM §

DESIGNING AN

1:117 (2013)

ALLAN

EFFECTIVE

(noting that unlike with

patents and trademarks, "[w]hether the information is a trade secret or not is really 'decided'
for the first time in court").
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1. The Intellectual PropertyClause of the Constitution
American intellectual property rights date back to the founding; intellectual property's security was considered instrumental in the development
and stability of the national economy. 26 In crafting the powers of the federal government, the founders explicitly granted Congress the power to provide federal protection for intellectual property, even going so far as to explain the provision in its wording.2 To wit, patents and copyrights are
granted "by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries ....28 That
is, to incentivize the creation of new intangible knowledge objects, the
Constitution authorizes Congress to grant a temporary monopoly such that,
at the end of that time, the intellectual property enters into the public do29
main.
2. The Scope and Subject Matter of IntellectualProperty Protections
Although trademark does not fall under the umbrella of the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution,30 all regimes of intellectual property
protection call for a "quid pro quo"-a trade between society and the
grantee such that each party benefits by the creation and protection of the
knowledge object.31 To obtain protection, a prospective intellectual property holder must demonstrate that the knowledge object he seeks to protect
falls within the scope of the relevant subject matter.7 Though the terms of
art vary, whether within or without the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution, each scheme requires that the knowledge object contain some
characteristic that sets it apart from preceding intellectual property.33 Then,
See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....");JAMES MADISON,
THE FEDERALIST No.43 271 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26.

27.

29.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2014) (providing varying durations for the term of a

copyright based upon the relevant date of creation, publication, and compliance with formalities); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (limiting a utility patent to a term of twenty years).
30. See generally In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that the Intellectual Property Clause does not authorize federal regulation of trademarks).
31.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216-17 (2003) (discussing and contrasting
the purposes of granting protections under patent and copyright systems in exchange for
contributions to the respective fields of invention and authorship); Bruce Day & Mike Martinez, The Roots of Intellectual Property: Trade Secrets, Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 62 J. KAN. B.A. 30, 36 (1993) (discussing the purposes of granting protection for
trademarks which function as indicia of source to consumers thus benefitting society).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1052; 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-104A; 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103.
33.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (requiring that a registerable word, symbol, or device meet
certain specifications; chiefly that the mark be used in commerce, identify the source of the
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presuming that all the appropriate formalities are met, the right is conferred.3 4 This monopoly right is presumed to place the relevant parties,
within and without the United States, on notice and designate the work, invention, or mark3 5 as outside the public domain.3 6
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution specifies that the
monopoly rights conferred on an intellectual property holder are limited by
time.3 Though these durations are subject to change, they are definite.38
Moreover, the duration of each monopoly's term is determined with respect
to the nature of the knowledge object that it protects.39
By contrast, trademarks exist outside the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause and are not limited by time. 40 Instead, they are limited by use in
commerce 4 1 and utility.42 Thus, even when a mark has been in constant use
in commerce, if it ever fails to perform its indicative function, it falls into
the public domain. In some cases, the trademark is lost irreparably such
product or service to the relevant consumer, and not engender confusion with a prior registration); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring that copyrightable works be original works of authorship fixed in a medium); 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103 (laying out the requirements of utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and being of eligible subject matter for patentability).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1052; 17 U.S.C. § 102; 35 U.S.C. § 151.
35.
Knowledge objects which are protected by copyright are known as "works," 17
U.S.C. § 102, those protected by trademark are known as "marks," 15 U.S.C. § 1051, and
those which are protected by utility patents are known as "inventions," 35 U.S.C. § 102.
36. See 15 U.S.C § 1072 ("Registration of a mark.., shall be constructive notice of
the registrant's claim of ownership thereof."); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (providing for liability for
infringement of a copyrighted work without a requirement of actual knowledge); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (providing that the monopoly right applies to all, regardless of actual notice).
37.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38.
See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that the constitutional requirement of a temporally limited monopoly is satisfied even if the duration is extended so long as the monopoly does end).
39.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (establishing that a work is protected by copyright for
seventy years beyond the duration of the author's life or, in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous works or those made for hire, a work is protected by copyright for ninety-five
years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of fixation, whichever is shorter. Further providing that works will receive varying lengths of protection depending on
their date of creation and/or publication); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing that the term of a utility patent runs from the date of issue until twenty years after the date of application).
40. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (observing that the differences between marks, inventions, and works are insurmountable to place them all under the
Intellectual Property Clause).
41.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (prescribing the requirements for registration of a mark).
42. See e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). In the
context of trademarks, "utility" is used to mean the intended function of trademarks as indicia of source and is distinct from the notion of "utility" in patent law and "functionality" as
understood in the context of trademarks and copyrights.
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that the word, symbol, or device can never be used exclusively again.
Thus, when a mark no longer indicates the source of the relevant product,
but instead identifies the product itself, it has become generic and therefore
loses protection. 44
However, even when under the protective veil of a patent, copyright, or
federal trademark registration, the monopoly, though intact, is not absolute.45 Though an intellectual property holder may exclude others from certain activities with regard to the relevant knowledge object, the law recognizes that absolute exclusion renders the exchange unfair to society at
large, hampers "the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts," and thereby
confounds the purposes of the Intellectual Property Clause as well as the
Lanham Act. 46 Thus, each protection scheme provides that there are certain uses which, though facially infringing, are lawful, and the limitations
on the monopoly right differ based on the strength and purpose of the protection.4
43. See generally Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding
that the term "aspirin" no longer signified a product produced by Bayer, but rather the
chemical compound acetyl salicylic acid, and thus could no longer receive protection as a
mark); see 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
44. See Bayer, 272 F. 505.
45. C.f 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 1125 (permitting limited fair use defenses to infringement
and dilution claims); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing for a fair use defense to infringement and a
four factor test of the accused use). In patent law there is no statutory provision for noninfringing uses, but courts have recognized a common law "experimental use" which is
analogous but more constrained. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("[T]he experimental use defense persists albeit in [a] very narrow form ....
").
46. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Lanham Act, codified in title fifteen, chapter
twenty-two of the United States Code, is the framework for national trademark registration.
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051 et seq.). Trademarks have several purposes, but the fundamental and historical rationale is to provide consumers with a way to quickly and efficiently gauge the value of a
product or service. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 16364 (1995)
(discussing the theoretical market purposes that trademark law serves). For example, by
creating an association between a mark and a specific product, line of products, or service
(e.g. the golden arches and McDonald's) a consumer could quickly and easily determine
whether the product was what they wanted. Id.
A second function of trademarks is to allow sellers to capture the good will of consumers
that they have invested in and cultivated. See id. at 164 (quoting and discussing 1 J.
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01 (3d ed. 1994)).
That is, because McDonalds has invested considerably in tying the golden arches with a uniform service, a predictable product, and a consistent experience, Congress provided for
trademark protection so that no other company, regardless of the quality of their product or
service, could use the golden arches and thereby evoke the same good will in consumers to
its commercial advantage. Id.
47. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 1125 (limiting fair use to non-commercial uses or where
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The price that society pays in this exchange-granting a monopoly-is
large and calculated to incentivize and reward creating intangible
knowledge objects that benefit society. Thus, it is fundamental to these
schemes that, when a right is granted improperly, each relevant protection
is stripped, in whole or in part, if it is shown that the knowledge object is
fatally deficient because it does not confer the required benefit to society.4 8
B. CongressionalIntent Underlying the DeclaratoryJudgment Act and its
ProceduralEffect

As described above, the monopoly rights that the intellectual property
regimes grant are capable of weaponization in litigation such that a party
may be subject to staggering damages or otherwise frightened into settlement. 49 Indeed, damages in patent, trademark, and copyright law are amenable to being "run up" by a plaintiff who is content to let the trespass continue and exercise the attendant leverage at his or her leisure. ° It was
precisely this "sad and saddening scenario," particularly with regard to patent owners, that motivated Congress to pass the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act of June 14, 1934 (the "Declaratory Judgment Act" or the
"Act"). 51 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court

of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.52

Prior to the passage of the Act, only a party alleging an infringement of
53
their own intellectual property, or any other legal right, could bring a suit.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, those parties with sufficiently conthe infringement is for legitimate competitive purposes such as the comparison of products);
17 U.S.C. § 107 (balancing the "purpose and character" of the infringing work, the nature of
the infringed work, the amount of the infringed work used, and the effect of the infringement on the market); see Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (allowing an experimental use when the
purpose of the use is "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry" and not in "furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business").
48. C.f 15 U.S.C. § 1052; 17 U.S.C. § 102; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
49. See supra Introduction.
50. See DeclaratoryJudgments, supra note 8 (statement of Prof. E. R. Sunderland).
51. 48 Stat. 955, Jud.Code s 274d; see Dolak, supra note 24, at 911 (discussing the legislative history and purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
53.
See Dolak, supra note 24, at 911.
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crete and opposing legal interests can avail themselves of a court to adjudicate their respective rights and responsibilities regardless of the posture
of
S• 54
5
the litigants so long as the court need not render an advisory opinion.
1. The Courts'EarlyApplication and Interpretationof the Declaratory
JudgmentAct Embodies its Purpose and Intent
Since its enactment, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been invoked in a
wide variety of litigation. In its first leading case, Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Haworth, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a life insurance company, faced with a claimant demanding payment on a policy
that the insurance company claimed had lapsed, could seek adjudication of
the legal rights of the parties despite the fact that the claimant failed to
56
bring any legal action against the insurer.
The Court held that the case
was properly brought because "the parties had taken adverse positions with
respect to their existing obligations,"
and this was sufficient to satisfy the
•
57
Constitution's Article III requirement.
In 1941, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had the
opportunity to consider the limits of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the
context of a patent dispute. In Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp.,58 as in
Aetna, the Court found the parties had opposing legal interests based only
on the asserted rights and obligations. 59 The declaratory defendant patentee, sought to prevent the plaintiff from importing a patented chemical-an
act that falls within the ambit of infringement. 6 0 As in Aetna, the events
here leading to the suit were attenuated, but in Treemond, the parties' actions were even less confrontational. Rather than direct contact between
the putative infringer and the patentee, the declaratory defendant patentee
contacted the putative infringer's customers and took out an advertisement
in a trade journal asserting that its patent encompassed the chemical in
question. 6 The intention of this was to brandish the patent as a weapon in
the marketplace and thereby deter the declaratory plaintiff from manufacturing and importing the accused product and the plaintiffs clients from
patronizing anyone but the defendant. 62
54. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (expounding on
the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
55.
300 U.S. 227 (1937).

56.

Id. at 236-39.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 242.
122 F.2d 702, 705-706 (3d Cir. 1941).
Treemond, 122 F.2d at 705.
Id. at 703.
Id. Tellingly, the court termed the case "typical." Id.
Id. at 705.

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BREEF

Vol. 6:2

On these facts, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey dismissed the declaratory action, finding that there was no controversy because the plaintiff had alleged non-infringement but failed to allege
notice of a claim of infringement, and the defendant's advertisement did
not give rise to a cause of action. 63 The circuit court decried this line of
reasoning, characterizing the lower court's opinion as destructive to the
purpose of the statute, particularly with respect to patent litigation.64 In reversing the district court, the circuit court observed that "[t]he parties [remained] in adversar[ial] positions in respect to legal rights and obligations"
and regardless of who brought suit, "[t]heir differences [were] concrete"
and thus amenable to adjudication. 65 In so doing, the Third Circuit recognized that with the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress opened the courts
to would-be defendants under precisely the same constitutional framework
that they had always been open to plaintiffs. 66 Moreover, the court established that the patent regime-and by extension that of trademarks and
copyrights-grants a right to the property holder and imposes on all others
the obligation to not trespass on that right. 67
Notwithstanding this holding, there are limitations on the jurisdiction of
courts in such matters. As the Supreme Court observed, "[t]he difference
between an abstract question and a 'controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy., 68 Although it is clear that the
intellectual property rightsholder has the legal right to exclude, equally vital to this inquiry-and to a finding of declaratory standing-is whether the
declaratory-plaintiff is so positioned that, if they were the defendant, liability could be found.6 9

63.

Id. at 703.
64. See id. ("Such a construction of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act would, in
our opinion, destroy its entire usefulness in patent litigation.").
65. Id. at 705 (citing Bliss & Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 102 F.2d 105, 108 (6th
Cir. 1939)).
66. Id. at 706.
67. See sources cited supra note 36 (enumerating the statutory provisions for constructive notice); see also Treemond, 122 F.2d at 706.
68. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
69. The Ninth Circuit has clarified that:
[a] better way to conceptualize the case or controversy standard is to focus on the
declaratory judgment plaintiff. An action for a declaratory judgment that a patent
is invalid, or that the plaintiff is not infringing, is a case or controversy if the plaintiff has a real and reasonable apprehension that he will be subject to liability if he
continues to manufacture his product.
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2. The Standards of DeclaratoryJudgment JusticiabilityHave Drifted
Away from the Requirements of Article III
Since the formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, there
has been a clear effort to articulate a stringent test of standing in declaratory actions, at least with regard to disputes over intellectual property.70 By
contrast, there has been no corresponding heightened standard established
in traditional avenues of litigation. 1
The Federal Circuit began to warp the justiciability analysis of declaratory actions in patent cases, 2 by imposing the threshold jurisdictional constraint of a prudential inquiry into whether the declaratory-plaintiff reasonably apprehended litigation by the intellectual property holder. v
The "reasonable apprehension" test had a destructive effect, undermining
courts' ability to properly find standing. That is, rather than a declaratoryplaintiff needing only to demonstrate the existence of contrary legal interests which may impact the "business realities" in play, the putative infringer was required to show that they feared imminent legal action on facts
supporting their own case.
This test consisted of two prongs which,
though nominally prudential, were applied jurisdictionally. 6 This inquiry
required that a declaratory-plaintiff make a showing that they apprehended
imminent litigation from the declaratory defendant based on the declaratory
defendant's actions, and that the declaratory-plaintiff s actions could expose it to liability or that it had taken substantial concrete steps towards

Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 944 (9th
Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted).
70. See Dolak, supra note 24, at 906-07.
71.
See, e.g., Stone St. Asset Trust v. Blue, 821 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (D. Del. 2011)
(citing Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of Am., 257 F.2d 485, 490
(3d Cir. 1958)) (noting that a declaratory judgment action need only satisfy the standing re-

quirements of Article III).
72. See de Larena, supra note 16, at 967-68 (observing that the heightened jurisdictional test has been largely followed in copyright and trademark disputes, albeit more broadly).
73.
See Dolak, supra note 24, at 904 (observing that the Federal Circuit has held that
accusations of infringement are jurisdictionally insufficient to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act).
74. Id. at 922. Compare Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (requiring a showing that the declaratory-plaintiff reasonably apprehended an imminent suit), with Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (allowing alternatives to a showing of a reasonable fear of an imminent suit).
75.
See Dolak, supra note 14, at 422 (discounting the court's characterization of the
reasonable apprehension test and analyzing its functionally constitutional limitation).
76. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735-36; BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d
975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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such activity." This standard rendered null the purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act by providing a bright line that an intellectual property
rightsholder could mindfully avoid.7' That is, if a rightsholder wished to
avoid the threat of a declaratory challenge to his or her property, he or she
need only conscientiously avoid satisfying the first prong of the test, thereby preventing the opposing party from raising the shield of declaratory
judgment while still menacing a putative infringer with their intellectual
property claims.
The Supreme Court ultimately vitiated this standard and instead enshrined a totality of the circumstances test in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech,
Inc.8 o However, abolishing the explicit bright line by reaffirming the holding in Aetna81 did not do away with additional tests.8 2 Instead, the totality
of the circumstances test has continued to warp the field and thwart the
purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act by raising hurdles to standing. 83
The decision has spawned a series of factors, which, though addressing the
conduct of both the rightsholder and the putative infringer, have the effect
of placing control of the standing inquiry in the defendant's hands8 4
By focusing largely on the conduct of the declaratory defendant, the
courts examine factors that provide a framework by which a rightsholder
may threaten a putative infringer without exposing themselves to a declaratory action that might jeopardize their intellectual property.8 5 Although the
Court proposed factors that are reasonable for determining whether it is

77. BP Chemicals, 4 F.3d at 978.
78. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007) (reaffirming that the test for jurisdiction called for by the Declaratory Judgment Act is the Article III
case and controversy requirement).
79. See, e.g., Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 705 (3d Cir. 1941) (observing that placing a condition precedent on a declaratory action which the declaratory defendant controlled rendered the Declaratory Judgment Act a nullity).
80. See generally MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118 (adopting and applying the "under all the
circumstances" test of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)).
81. Id. at 126-27.
82. See Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., C-12-4411 EMC, 2013 WL 184125, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (crediting the Federal Circuit with creating a series of new factors to consider in the wake of MedImmune).
83.
See id. (enumerating thirteen factors which courts consider in standing inquiries in

declaratory actions, six of which relate to actions controlled by the intellectual property right
holder).
84. Id.

85. Compare id. (listing factors which limit jurisdiction in intellectual property cases),
with Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 705 (3d Cir. 1941) (disclaiming any
requirement that declaratory-plaintiffs show more than notice, direct or indirect).
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prudent to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory action, district courts
have employed the factors enumerated since Medlmmune in their jurisdictional analysis.
Thus, though the Supreme Court attempted to normalize
the barriers to bringing such actions, the history of allowing the prudential
87
considerations to bleed into the jurisdictional analysis has left a stain.
In contrast to the standards that courts have applied to intellectual property disputes, recent litigation not involving intellectual property has enjoyed greater jurisdictional latitude in declaratory actions.88 One such case
is that of Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawaii v. Holder89 in
which the church asserted that its right to use, possess, and cultivate mari-

86. The District Court for the Northern District of California enumerated the factors
that other courts have considered specifically: how thoroughly the right holder analyzed the
putative infringement; the language used in communications between the parties; whether
the right holder set a deadline to respond; prior litigation between the parties; the right holder's history of enforcing the right at issue; whether the putative infringer altered its behavior
as a result of the parties' interaction; the number of times the right holder has contacted the
putative infringer; whether the right holder is a troll; whether the right holder refused to
covenant not to sue; whether the right holder identified a specific knowledge object as infringed and the specific infringement in its communications; the familiarity of the right
holder with the accused infringement; the time elapsed after an assertion of infringement;
whether the declaratory-plaintiff appears to have been trying to create circumstances which

would satisfy the case and controversy requirement. Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
C-12-4411 EMC, 2013 WL 184125, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (citing ABB Inc. v.
Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) cert. granted
on other grounds, 12-398, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 694, -L.Ed.2d
, 2012 WL
4508118 (2012); Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Technologies, Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1374-76 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Applera Corp. v. Michigan Diagnostics, LLC, 594 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158-60 (D. Mass. 2009)).
87.
See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (discussing MedImmune's lowering of the standing bar in declaratory actions and then
applying prudential factors jurisdictionally); Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., C-124411 EMC, 2013 WL 184125, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (applying a variety of prudential factors to the jurisdictional analysis).
88.
See, e.g., Protocols, LLC v. Leavitt, 549 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding
standing regarding an issue of contingent liability and observing that "a contingent liability,
by definition, may not arise for a considerable time, if ever. The consequences of a contingent liability, however, may well be actual or imminent."); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Lloyd's & Companies, 241 F.3d 154, 177 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming jurisdiction when the
district court found "there was a 'practical likelihood' that the high level excess carriers'
policies would be reached").
89.
676 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2012).

AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BREEF

Vol. 6:2

juana was infringed by federal drug laws. 90 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the pre-enforcement claim of the church could stand
because, despite the absence of any past, present, or pending legal charges
against the church, the plaintiffs had made a sufficient case that their activities surpassed the minimum threshold of concreteness, that the government
had indirectly signaled its intent to enforce the statute by its actions with
regard to a third party, and that the government's action was sufficient to
demonstrate a threat of adverse consequences for the church. 91
C. The Doctrine of Standing

Bound up in this discussion of the limits of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is the doctrine of standing and its irreducible threshold of "case and
controversy." As the Supreme Court has observed repeatedly, "the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only., 92 Thus, while
prudential doctrines permit courts to decline to exercise discretion in declaratory actions, these prudential doctrines are distinct from courts' jurisdictional constraints. 93 In declaratory actions, the jurisdictional threshold is
no higher than in any other case
and it is therefore essential to inquire as to
94
the character of that threshold.
In cases on the subject, the Supreme Court has articulated, time and
again, that the critical elements which define a party's standing to bring a
case are that the plaintiff must show (1) they have suffered an "injury in
fact" or violation of a legal interest or right which is "(a) concrete and particularized... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical";
(2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's
conduct that is not "th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court"; and (3) that it is "likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 9 5
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 834.

Id. at 836-37.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 138 (2007) (Thomas, J., dis-

senting) (quoting Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240) (internal quotation marks omitted).

93. The Supreme Court has clarified that "even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court [may refrain] from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized
grievances'...." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499-500 (1975)).

94.

See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128-29.

95.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (reciting the
need for an injury that is traceable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by the court);
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This standing inquiry, though highly fact specific, is no more difficult to
apply in the inverted procedural posture of a declaratory action than it is in
the familiar posture where the plaintiff claims infringement against a defendant. 96 In the case of a declaratory action for invalidity and noninfringement, the declaratory-plaintiff can allege an injury in that they are,
by the grant of title to the intellectual property holder, prohibited from undertaking an action without permission.
This injury would naturally be
insubstantial if they had no means or inclination to undertake the prohibited
action. Therefore, this turns on whether they intend to take or have taken
steps that could plausibly give rise to liability for infringement. 99 Courts
are certainly adept at judging a party's capacity and/or substantive action
towards an end.100 The causal connection is clear-the existence or scope
of the monopoly right granted to the declaratory defendant is itself the
cause of the above injury.10 1 And finally, given the tight nexus of injury
and causation, a court can redress the injury, whether by declaring the action at issue not infringing, by invalidating the defendant's monopoly, or by
otherwise limiting it with respect to the declaratory-plaintiff s intended action. 10 2 While the court can decline to exercise jurisdiction for prudential
reasons,103 the tendency of courts to address these prudential factors to limit
jurisdiction is improper.1 4

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
96. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 239-40 ("The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to 'cases of actual controversy,' manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision
and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.
The word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather than of definition.").
97. See Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 131 (discussing the coercive nature of a patent right)
(quoting Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943)).
98. Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 1941) (observing that
"the mere existence of the patent is not a cloud on title" and thus there must be more for a
controversy to exist).
99. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2013).
100. See, e.g., id. (implicating courts' ability to make determinations of such factual
matters by stating that such a showing would satisfy the Court's jurisdictional requirements).
101.
See id. (identifying injury as the only missing component of Already's claim to
standing).
102. See id. at 725-26 (observing that Already had standing prior to the covenant and
thus the remedy of invalidity of the intellectual property right was sufficient to satisfy the
redressability requirement).
103. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007).
104. See Dolak, supra note 14, at 419-25 (distinguishing the power to hear a case from
the wisdom of adjudicating the issues at the time it is brought, and noting the pattern of the
Federal Circuit in failing to distinguish the tests).
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In non-intellectual property cases, courts have had little difficulty analyzing the Article III requirement in isolation by segregating the jurisdictional test from the prudential factors of justiciability. In Massachusetts v.
EPA, 10 5 for example, the Supreme Court examined whether the petitioners
met each of the three prongs discussed above.10 6 Observing that the question of standing was "whether petitioners have such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination," the Court held that the state had standing.1 0 The Court
was satisfied that, though remote, the harm alleged-the rise of the sea and
destruction of coastal lands-was sufficiently real. 0 8 Moreover, the Court
was clear that though the harm could only be partially attributed to the inaction of the EPA, such attribution was sufficient to sustain a finding of
causation." Finally, although the action that the agency could take would
not fully redress the harm alleged, the fact that it could admit some relief
was sufficient to render a finding that the injury was redressable 1
Thus,
in its holding, the Supreme Court demonstrated that the question of standing yields broadly to concrete if somewhat tenuous relationships.
D. The PrudentialDoctrine of Mootness is a Necessary Component of this
JurisdictionalAnalysis
As previously mentioned, the issue of impermissible restriction extends
not only to actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, but also to
the consideration of the mootness of counterclaims which are brought by
traditional defendants. Though the most immediate case illustrating this
point is that of Already v. Nike, the problem is endemic to all branches of
intellectual property litigation."
The question of mootness is not a frivolous one and, indeed, the doctrine

105.
106.
107.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 516.
Id. at 517 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
108. Id. at 526.
109. Id. at 523-24.
110. Id. at 525-26.
111. See Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett, 04 C 3049, 2005 WL 2445898, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2005) aff'd sub nom. Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the plaintiff had brought forty-nine other meritless cases in the Northern District of Illinois);
Ian Polonsky, You Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and CopyrightTrolling on
the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 72-77 (2012) (discussing the history of patent and
copyright trolls).
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governing the inquiry is only partially prudential. 112 Just as with its initial
standing inquiry, a court must consider whether the opinion it is asked to
render is concrete or advisory when analyzing whether it should reach an
issue presented by one of the parties."' A case or question before the court
can be rendered moot "if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to re,,114
cur.
The Court has circumscribed this doctrine with a number of equitable
considerations which can render an otherwise moot point nonmoot. 15 Primary among these considerations is the possibility that a wrongful act
might be repeated while evading judicial review. As the Supreme Court
observed in Roe v. Wade, 116 there are some cases that come11to
a natural end
7
before a court is able to fully adjudicate the parties' rights.
A second restriction the Court has recognized is that one party can act or
refrain from acting to remedy the instant grievance before a court rules on a
case, but, so long as "[t]he underlying question persists and is agitated by
the continuing activities" of a party, a case can properly be heard.118 Furthermore, courts have limited the doctrine of mootness by the principle
that, "[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the
outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot," even if the claim which initially gave rise to the litigation is no longer before the court. 119
As in the case of standing in declaratory actions, courts have been inconsistent when analyzing the effect of intervening events when considering
the mootness of a case. 120 Courts tend to find cases moot more often when

112. See generally Matthew I. Hall, The PartiallyPrudentialDoctrine of Mootness, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 562 (2009) (distinguishing between a court's jurisdictional power to
hear a case and prudential power to decline to hear it).
113.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) ("A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.") (quoting United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253

U.S. 113, 116 (1920)).
114 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189
(2000) (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)) (emphasis added).
115.
See Hall, supra note 112, at 576.
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. Id. at 125.
118.
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 179 (1968).
119.
Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)
(quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. See Economou, supra note 15, at 119 (comparing the Federal Circuit's inconsistent
determinations of whether intervening events moot a case and opining on the confusing ef-

fect on lower courts).
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the central issue is intellectual property rights and, most specifically, when
121
the validity of those rights are challenged.
The Federal Circuit in partic22
phenomenon.1
this
with
credited
is
ular
There are generally two ways that observers find that courts have shielded the rights of intellectual property holders. 1 2 First, in the instance of declaratory judgments, the declaratory-plaintiff will commonly seek a declaration of non-infringement and invalidity. 124
While each claim
independently relieves the declaratory-plaintiff of liability, they are not mutually exclusive. 12 5 However, it has been the practice of the Federal Circuit, when reviewing a finding of both non-infringement and invalidity, to
reverse the finding of invalidity. 126 The rationale for such reversals is that,
upon finding the right at issue not infringed by the putatively infringing activity, the standing of the defendant to attack the right's validity vanishes. 1 2 The second method of shielding the intellectual property holder's
rights is by permitting an intervening act, such as a covenant not to sue, to
moot the case and thereby any counterclaim for invalidity. 121
1. Events ThatAre Insufficient to Moot a Case
Among the most common ways to moot a claim is the intervening act of
a party. This can be a defendant's cessation of the wrongful act rendering
the principle case moot, or the plaintiff s covenant
not to pursue litigation
129

rendering a defendant's counterclaim moot.

121.
See Dolak, supra note 24, at 916-17 (observing the uncertainty generated by the
Federal Circuit's frequent refusals to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction, in light of
Congress' explicit intent that the Declaratory Judgment Act be liberally construed in order
to provide certainty of rights and responsibilities to litigants).
122. See Economou, supra note 15, at 117-21 (discussing the role of the Federal Circuit
in this confusion).
123.
See id. at 91, 105 (identifying two courses by which an intellectual property right
holder may moot review of their property right).
124. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 92 n.12 (1993) (reciting a
series of cases in which non-infringement and invalidity were asserted in parallel).
125.
See id. at 96 (holding that courts may find non-infringement and invalidity concurrently).
126. Id. at 89. Although, per the Supreme Court, a claim of invalidity is not automatically moot on a finding of non-infringement, a court may discretionarily find it so. Id. at
102-03.
127.
See, e.g. id. at 90.
128.
See discussion infra Parts 0, 0.
129.
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
189 (2000) (discussing the applicability of the voluntary cessation doctrine); see generally
Economou, supra note 15 (discussing intellectual property holders' use of promises not to
sue as a method of divesting a court of jurisdiction to avoid challenges to the validity of a

2015

STANDING IN THE THICKET

However, the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism when viewing
such actions by parties and has made it clear that "voluntary cessation of
challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct
as soon as the case is dismissed."130 This suspicion causes the Court to inquire into whether such conduct could be resumed.131 Thus, sometimes a
court will continue to exercise jurisdiction even after an intervening event
has rendered the case apparently moot.
One such instance is City of Erie v. Pap'sA.M. 13 2 in which the plaintiff,
the proprietor of a nude entertainment establishment, successfully challenged a city public decency ordinance and, having prevailed in the state
Supreme Court, closed the establishment and sold off the property.133 On
the defendant's appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that, because he had closed the business at issue and he planned a quiet life of retirement, the case was moot.1 4 The Court disagreed, observing that seventy-two was not a prohibitive age to reopen a nude dancing establishment
and that the company which had managed the original club at issue was
still incorporated.1 35 Moreover, the Court held that the city of Erie suffered
"an ongoing injury because" the lower court's ruling prevented it from enforcing its ordinance, and if the ordinance was later found constitutional,
the city would be free to apply it "and the availability of such relief [was]
sufficient to prevent the case from being moot. ,136 Thus, by finding that,
despite the plaintiffs apparent and sworn abandonment of the interest at
issue, the defendant seeking further adjudication of a right might continue
its cause of action, the Court recognized that courts may be improperly manipulated by the mootness 13
doctrine so that a question properly before the
court might go unreviewed. 7
2. Events ThatAre Sufficient to Moot a Case
Unlike more traditional litigation, courts have tended to find counterclaims in intellectual property cases mooted by the intervening acts of
plaintiffs despite the continued legal interests of the parties. For example,
right).
130. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (citing City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)).
131. Id.
132. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
133. Id. at 287-88.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 288.
137. Id. at 288-89.
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the trademark dispute in Already v. Nike involved a situation that was similar to Pap's A.M., but the Supreme Court decided to hold Already's counterclaim moot."'
Upon encountering resistance in the form of a counterclaim challenging
the federal registration of the "Air Force 1" mark, the plaintiff, Nike, like
the plaintiff in Pap's A.M., undertook measures to end the litigation it had
initiated.13 9 In Nike's attempt to moot the case, it issued a "covenant not to
sue" to Already that "promised that Nike would not raise against Already
or any affiliated entity any trademark or unfair competition claim based on
any of Already's existing footwear designs, or any future Already designs
that constituted a 'colorable imitation' of Already's current products. 140 In
the language of the covenant, in its briefs, and at oral arguments, the respondent emphatically declared that, while it had voluntarily abandoned
any claim against the petitioner for certain products, it had reserved the
right to bring suit under
its mark for future products that fall outside the
14 1
covenant.
the
scope of
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
upon consideration of the covenant and Already's insistence that its counterclaim be heard and adjudicated, imposed the burden of a declaratoryplaintiff requiring a "demonstrat[ion] that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over [the] counterclaim. 142 Already failed to articulate any concrete plans to produce shoes outside the scope of the covenant which might
infringe the mark it contests, and consequently the district court dismissed
the counterclaim and the Supreme Court affirmed. 143
138.
139.

Already, 133 S. Ct. at 733.
Id. at 725.

140. Id.; The specific language at issue reads:
[Nike] unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain from making any
claim(s) or demand(s).., against Already or any of its.., related business enti-

ties ...[including] distributors ... and employees of such entities and all customers.., on account of any possible cause of action based on or involving trademark
infringement, unfair competition, or dilution, under state or federal law ... relating
to the NIKE Mark based on the appearance of any of Already's current and/or previous footwear product designs, and any colorable imitations thereof, regardless of
whether that footwear is produced.., or otherwise used in commerce before or after the Effective Date of this Covenant.
Id. at 728 (quoting the relevant portions of the covenant at issue).
141. Id. at 728; Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 721 (2013) (No. 11-982) ("You are absolutely right, Justice Kennedy, that there are
shoes that they could make in the future that would not be covered by the covenant. There
could be an injury about that.").

142.
143.

Already, 133 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting the lower court's reasoning).
Id. at 733.

2015

STANDING IN THE THICKET

Thus, the Court, having embraced the proposition that the mootness of a
counterclaim is tested in the same way as the justiciability of a declaratory
action without deference to the subject matter of the suit, it is appropriate to
consider their legal framework in tandem. 144 Furthermore, it is evident that
courts' analysis of mootness suffers from the same defect as in declaratory
intellectual property cases. 4 5 Therefore, it is appropriate that the proper
standards for these analyses be drawn from the above-mentioned framework. 146
II. THE BASIC ARTICLE III CASE AND CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT IS THE
PROPER STANDARD IN EVALUATING STANDING IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND THE MOOTNESS OF COUNTERCLAIMS

It is the purpose of American intellectual property protections to preserve the relevant property holder's right to exclude others from practicing,
employing, or duplicating the relevant knowledge object subject to conditions set with the nature of the knowledge object in mind. 14 7 Further, in securing such a protection, be it patent, trademark, or copyright, that exclusive right is granted and constructive notice is presumed by virtue of its
registration. 148 Thus, this property right, like a fence or series of signs enclosing a plot of land, serves to inform every person that may happen
across it that, without permission of the relevant owner, their entrance (infringement) on the land (intellectual property right) is a trespass. However,
unlike a plot of land, an intangible knowledge object is not inherently and
definitively limited by geography or understood in physical space. Rather,
the parcel of rights granted by any intellectual property registration abuts
the activities of any person within the jurisdiction of federal law if that activity occupies the same or similar subject matter. 149 In short, these rights,
which serve a constitutionally and statutorily prescribed and delineated
144. Id.
145.
See supra Parts 0, 0 (analyzing courts' improper jurisdictional analysis in declaratory actions and counterclaims).
146. See supra Part I.
147.
See supra Part 0.
148.
15 U.S.C § 1072 (2014) ("Registration of a mark... shall be constructive notice of
the registrant's claim of ownership thereof."); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (providing for liability for
infringement of a copyrighted work without a requirement of actual knowledge); 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154, 271 (providing that the monopoly right applies to all, regardless of actual notice).
149.
This is the result of the nexus of the monopolistic nature of the right and the notice
function of the grants. See supra Part 0. Because an intellectual property holder has the
exclusive right to practice, use, or copy the relevant knowledge object, and the world at
large is considered to be on notice, the actions of any person participating in the relevant
field are strictly limited. C.f 15 U.S.C § 1072; 17 U.S.C. § 501; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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purpose, touch every person who participates in a field to which they relate.
Moreover, the rights of an intellectual property holder must serve the
purposes for which they are granted and must meet both the subject matter
and formal requirements imposed on them by the relevant laws. 150 If a patent, trademark, or copyright fails this standard, then, by definition, a monopoly right has been granted that improperly includes an element of the
public domain and thus violates both the constitutional requirement and
congressional intent. 151 This enclosure, though intangible, is similar to a
private person being granted the right to charge a toll for a toll-free bridge.
This Article certainly does not argue that, because these rights extend so
broadly, all persons have standing to challenge an intellectual property
right. However, the Declaratory Judgment Act and the doctrines of standing and mootness must admit litigants as freely in this arena as they do in
any other.1 52 The language of the Declaratory Judgment Act, being procedural only, draws no distinction between declaratory actions and traditional
cases except regarding the posture of the parties. 15 Thus, the language of
the statute having established the Article III minimum as the threshold, the
same jurisdictional analysis applies. 154 Moreover, courts cannot allow the
amorphous nature of such rights to be shields for property holders to escape
judicial review of their validity. 155 Indeed, courts must view such maneuvers "with a critical eye" lest they be permitted156
to flout the constitutional
and statutory purposes of the respective regimes.

150.
151.

See discussion and accompanying notes supra Part 0.
See supra notes 39, 41, and accompanying discussion.

152.

See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (holding that the

language of the Declaratory Judgment Act does not establish additional jurisdictional barriers to judicial review); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (applying the

standards for declaratory jurisdiction to the mootness analysis).
153.

Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-41.

154.

Compare id. (articulating the Article III minimum jurisdictional threshold as apply-

ing to declaratory actions), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992) (reaffirming the constitutional minimum of Article III as the broad, three part injury,
causation, and redressability test).

155.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007) (embracing the

standard articulated in Aetna as applicable in a declaratory action concerning patents with-

out regard to subject matter).
156. See Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287
(2012) (articulating the strict standards of the voluntary cessation doctrine).
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A. The ProperLegal Frameworkfor the Standardof Justiciabilityof a
DeclaratoryAction in Intellectual PropertyDisputes is the Article III
Minimum as Applied in Other DeclaratoryActions
Though the Declaratory Judgment Act is directed at a broad range of litigation subject matters, Congress intended only to provide a procedural
mechanism for the adjudication of rights such that putative defendants need
not live in the shadow of a Damoclean complaint. 157 By misapplying the
jurisdictional test, courts have thwarted this purpose. As observed above,
the monopoly right that is granted to intellectual property holders, though
limited, is only a negative right-a right to exclude. 158 By its very nature,
such a right is a legal interest and, though it can be bent to many functions,
it can serve only to prevent others from taking advantage of, directly or indirectly, a right holder's work. 159 Moreover, by its nature, the constructive
notice function of the bundle of rights places the holder in a hostile
posture
1 60
object.
knowledge
the
use
or
practice,
copy,
to
wish
who
any
to
Though the Supreme Court recognized that the "reasonable apprehension
test" fashioned by the Federal Circuit was an inappropriate metric of a declarative-plaintiff s standing, 161 the application of their substitute "totality
of the circumstances test" has resulted in a similar problem. 162 Among the
factors that courts now consider when determining whether there is a case
and controversy are: 16 the depth and extent of infringement analysis conducted by the patent holder; 164 the strength of any threatening language in

157.
See discussion supra Part 0.
158.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (providing for a civil action for infringement of a
trademark and articulating the basis for such a suit); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating the exclusive rights of a copyright holder); Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584
(6th Cir. 1911) (articulating the negative nature of the patent right and contrasting it with an
affirmative right to practice a patent).
159.
The inherently negative monopoly right renders the right holder a gate-keeper. See
supra note 158.
160. The Third Circuit most clearly articulated the universally oppositional nature of the
exclusive right in Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., saying that a patent need not be recited
in the form of a threat, but, in fact, the right is so pointed that cagey and indirect insinuations are sufficient to confirm an intellectual property right holder's hostile posture. 122
F.2d 702, 705 (3rd Cir. 1941).
161. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007).
162. Because the lower courts have interpreted the prudential factors of the circumstances test-which inform the courts' discretion to decline a case-to be jurisdictional, the
standing requirement is still impermissibly restrictive. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
163.
This list is drawn from Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., C-12-4411 EMC,
2013 WL 184125, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013).
164. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1374-76 (Fed. Cir.
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communications between the parties; 165 whether the patent holder imposed
a deadline to respond; 166 the number of times the patent holder has contacted the alleged infringer;' 67 whether the patentee refused to give assurance it
will not enforce its patent;16 and whether the patent holder has identified a
specific patent and specific infringing products 169. Though there are other
factors that courts look to,1 70 this list highlights the problem-these factors
turn on the behavior of an intellectual property holder. 1
When courts institutionalize deference to the behaviors of the property
holder-whether they create bright lines and magic words, or guidelines
and balancing tests, the result is the same-it vitiates the purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
By defining specific actions that confer jurisdiction in a declaratory action, the property holder can once again dictate
the terms of engagement.1 3 They can, through careful phrasing and strategic actions, wield their right as a weapon against putative infringers.1 74 By
drawing these bright lines and articulating tests above and beyond the baseline case and controversy requirement, courts have let intellectual property
holders hang the Damoclean sword anew, thus undermining the purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Instead, courts should recognize that, when an entity secures an intellec2007).
165.
166.

167.

ABB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Id. at 1364.

168. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
169. Id. at 1340; Applera Corp. v. Michigan Diagnostics, LLC, 594 F. Supp. 2d 150,
158-60 (D. Mass. 2009).
170. See supra note 86.
171.
Compare Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (articulating the first prong of the reasonable apprehension test as "acts of
defendant indicating an intent to enforce its patent"), with Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., C-12-4411 EMC, 2013 WL 184125, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) (compiling a list of
factors, many of which focus on the litigious nature of the declaratory defendant).
172. See Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1941) (discussing the hazards posed by allowing the declaratory defendant to control the condition
precedent to a declaratory action's justiciability).
173.
In discussing the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Third Circuit observed that prior to the act, the formalities of legal actions allowed parties to "publicly claim
an infringement and threaten to sue the manufacturer or anyone who dealt with the product"
and "[u]nless the patentee's actions were of such a character that he might be shackled with
the sanctions of the law of unfair competition, he had his alleged infringer at his mercy."
Treemond, 122 F.2d at 703-04.
174. See Dolak, supra note 22, at 947 n.253 (describing the purposes of practitioners
who, in an attempt to brandish their patent right over a putative infringer, craft carefully
worded communications so as to give notice without triggering a declaratory action).

2015

STANDING IN THE THICKET

tual property right, inherent to that bundle of rights is an adversarial
stance. 175 Though amenable to waiver in the case of licensing and capable
of abandonment or assignment, 17 6 securing intellectual property rights places the property holder in a hostile legal posture, posting a "no trespassing"
sign to all the world.1 7 This legal interest, though insufficient on its own
to confer general standing on any party interested in challenging the property right, contributes a necessary piece to a finding of standing:
the ad1
verse legal interest of the intellectual property rightsholder. 78
This is not to suggest that the securing of exclusive rights is sufficient to
confer standing on any passerby who feels the whim to challenge a property right. Consistent with the Declaratory Judgment Act, courts should require the traditional hallmarks of standing: that the declaratory-plaintiff
show their own concrete injury, that there be a causal relationship between
that injury and the defendant's property right, and that the court be capable
of redressing the injury if the plaintiff is successful.1 79 In causes of action
alleging invalidity, causation and redressability are not difficult to show but
the plaintiff must still plead sufficient facts of injury which demonstrate
that at a minimum they have real and concrete plans that, absent a finding
of non-infringement or invalidity, would subject them to liability." 0
B. The Article III Standing Analysis Provides the ProperStandardfor
Assessing the Mootness of Counterclaims in IntellectualProperty Disputes
When a claim is brought against a putative infringer in cases where a
counterclaim of invalidity is properly before the court, it is important that
the plaintiff not be allowed to simply retreat, weapon intact, with the freedom to strike again."' By permitting Nike to covenant not to sue Already

175.
See, e.g., Treemond, 122 F.2d at 705.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2014); 17 U.S.C. § 201(d); 35 U.S.C. § 261.
177.
See supra note 36 and accompanying discussion.
178.
Treemond, 122 F.2d at 706 ("[T]he mere existence of the patent is not a cloud on
title, enabling any apprehensive manufacturer to remove it by suit.").
179.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted) (reciting the elements of standing).
180. The concept of the apprehension of liability is key in that, apprehension of liability-as opposed to suit-looks to the putative infringer's actions, whereas apprehension of
suit looks to the property right holder's actions. See Dolak, supra note 14, at 414-15 (discussing the evolution of the courts' focus on apprehension of liability to an apprehension of
suit).
181.
See Treemond, 122 F.2d at 704 (observing that by abusing the one sided nature of
intellectual property litigation, a right holder could withdraw "and repeat the process" without prejudicing his claim much less endangering his right).
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for past, present, and continuing actions, 1 2 the Court and the covenant left
the door open to avenues of future litigation."' In so doing, the Court allowed a conflict entailing definite legal interests and sufficiently concrete
facts to permit adjudication, capable of repetition, to pass in a manner in
which the central issue of rights and obligations evades judicial review.
Here, there is a great divergence in the treatment of intellectual property
cases and those in traditional avenues of the law.18 4 In Already v. Nike, rather than viewing the retreating plaintiff's attempt to scuttle any judicial re-5
view of the right that formed the basis of the initial action with suspicion, 1
the Court is content to characterize a covenant of limited scope as unconditional.1 16 This covenant is, on its face, designed to allow Nike to assert this
right against Already later.18 7 Moreover, the Court ignored the statements
made by the moving party at oral argument that the covenant explicitly left
open the possibility of future litigation. 88 By so doing, the Court relinquished jurisdiction over a live case and controversy.
The Court drew attention to this by referring to the application of the test
that is applied to declaratory-plaintiffs for standing. 8 9 Here, as in cases
discussed above, the Court considered the behavior of the parties and the
apprehension of future legal disputes. 90 Specifically, it invoked the voluntary cessation doctrine, a test aimed explicitly at the party attempting to es-

182. Already, LLC, v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2013).
183.
"Our point is not that it covers every future shoe of theirs ... they could make in
the future that would not be covered by the covenant. There could be an injury about that."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (No.
11-982).
184. See discussion supra Part 0
185.
See Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287
(2012) ("Such postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from review by this
Court must be viewed with a critical eye." (citing City News & Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha,
531 U.S. 278, 283-284 (2001)).
186. Already, 133 S.Ct. at 728 (reciting the limiting language of the covenant as "based
on the appearance of any of Already's current and/or previous footwear product designs,
and any colorable imitations thereof' (emphasis added)).
187.
Compare supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Nike's explicit reservation at oral argument of action against Already under the mark in question), with supra
note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the plain limitations in the language of Nike's
covenant not to sue).
188.
Compare Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 721 (2013) (No. 11-982) (articulating the ability to file suit in the future against Already
under the "Air Force 1" mark), with Already, 133 S.Ct. at 730-31 (constructing Nike's covenant broadly).
189. Already, 133 S.Ct. at 726.
190. Id. at 727-28.
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cape the Court's jurisdiction."' But instead of inquiring into the legal interests, rights, and abilities of Nike to enforce its mark against a competitor
that had demonstrated, beyond doubt, its concrete interest in creating shoes
which resemble a particular design, the Court focused
on whether Already
192
had demonstrated Nike's failure to meet the test.
As though to mitigate this improper test, the Court next turned to the petitioner's hypothetical ability to infringe the mark at issue outside the
bounds of the covenant before them.1 93 This inquiry and the attendant
questions at oral argument 194 called for Already to lay out any plans they
currently have to infringe Nike's mark that would expose them to liability.1 95 Aside from missing the point in that any current design, yet produced or otherwise, would fall within the limited scope of the covenant not
to sue,196 the Court's inquiry and line of questions served to constrict the
mootness doctrine's lenience toward such claims. That is, in order to conclude that Nike could not reinitiate action against Already, the Court observed that Already could not show the opposite, shifting the burden im-

properly. 197
By contrast, the Court should have applied the reasoning it employed in
Pap's A.M. and permitted the challenge to go forward despite the dissipation of the underlying circumstances. Even though the posture of the parties in Pap's A.M., where the plaintiff was attempting to moot, is the inverse of the posture in Already, where the defendant was seeking to pursue,
the Court asks these two parties to satisfy the same test.1 98 If the court is
willing to recognize that these cases are so similarly situated as to be burdened by the same test, it should measure the burden equally and against
the similarly situated parties. 99 That is, by applying the same test, the
191. Id. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 728.
193. Id.
194. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721
(2013) (No. 11-982).
195.
See Already, 133 S. Ct. at 728 (applying the voluntary cessation doctrine and observing that Already had not shown how it could produce a shoe not covered by the covenant in the future).
196. The covenant precludes suit "based on the appearance of any of Already's current
and/or previous footwear product designs, and any colorable imitations thereof, regardless
of whether that footwear is produced." Id.
197. Id. at 727-28.
198.
Compare Already, 133 S. Ct. at 727 (requiring that Nike show "it 'could not reasonably be expected' to resume its enforcement" (citation omitted)), with Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. at 288 (requiring absolute clarity that the behavior at issue would not reoccur).
199.
Compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000) (articulating the stringent standard of the voluntary cessation doctrine), with
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court implicitly acknowledges the twin nature of the parties' positions.
Although one could argue that the interest of the City of Erie is a more
compelling interest because it concerns a municipality's ability to enforce
its law, the same is true of an intellectual property right. 20 0 The monopoly
created by the government when granting a trademark registration imposes
a similar set of obligations as does a public decency ordinance-both impose on the public a legal obligation to refrain from a defined behavior.2 1
In Pap'sA.M., despite the closure and sale of the premises of the contested
night club, and the sworn statement of the owner that he looked forward to
retirement and had no intention of restarting the enterprise, the Court was
willing to find this failed to moot the question. 202 In stark relief, the appellant in Already v. Nike had not shuttered its design houses or factories, had
not contracted its business one iota, and vowed to continue competing with
the respondent in the shoe market. 2 °' However, because Already failed to
articulate a specific plan to infringe Nike's trademark
outside the ambit of
2 4
moot.
controversy
the
held
court
the covenant the
Although Already did not articulate a plan to trespass on Nike's mark,20 5
Nike's actions of registering, asserting, and reserving the ongoing right to
assert the mark all undermine the absolute clarity that the voluntary cessation doctrine demands. 206 Taken in context with the demonstrated interest
of Already to compete in the narrow field of that specific design clearly
constitutes a live controversy ripe for adjudication.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended to provide
a method for resolving disputes of all kinds at the earliest stage that a court
might consider them. This intent recognized that the purpose of the courts
is not so narrow as to simply provide those who have been wronged a

Already, 133 S. Ct. at 727, 732 (applying a deferential voluntary cessation test), and Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. at 287-89 (applying a stringent voluntary cessation test).
200. Both are obligations created by legislative action. See supra Part 0.
201.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
202. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 287-88.
203. Already, 133 S. Ct. at 729.
204. Id. at 728-29.
205. Id. at 733.
206. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

189 (2000).
207. Compare Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that the controversy remained live), and Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 287-88 (holding the
controversy remained live), with Already, 133 S. Ct. at 732 (finding the controversy rendered moot).
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method of compensation, and certainly not so one-sided as to provide a
cudgel with which a market may be terrorized. But, rather courts exist to
resolve disputes pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of the parties as
recognized by law, regardless of their posture or the peculiar providence of
its timing.
Further, by shaping the intellectual property scheme as it exists, the intent of the framers and of Congress has been to fence in no more than is
necessary to promote the inventive, aesthetic, and commercial interests of
society. Anything more is a manifest harm to the public broadly and a
clear injury to any who wish to make use of the intangible knowledge objects of which we are all in common possession. Though this harm is not
sufficient to satisfy the first prong of a standing inquiry, the possession of
the right is a flag of claim that sets the claimant in opposition to all others.
In an arena with parties so fluidly in contact with one another's rights,
the courts must, in the interests of meeting the constitutional requirements
of standing and mootness and the statutory purposes of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, recognize that the procedural differences between a declaratory-plaintiff and a counterclaimant are, at most, nominal. In essence, these
parties stand in the same posture and should be subject to the same constitutional standards.
Moreover, the discrepancy between the constitutional standards that declaratory plaintiffs and counterclaimants must meet in traditional litigation
and in intellectual property disputes results in an inherently property holder
friendly system in the intellectual property sphere. Beyond simply creating
an impermissible judicial imbalance that misapplies the Article III case and
controversy requirement creating an unconstitutionally higher threshold,
the misapplication thwarts the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
which was directed in large part to resolving issues in intellectual property.
By normalizing the justiciability analysis across both the procedural postures of the parties and between fields of law, the courts can properly serve
the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, consistently safeguard the
limits and requirements of Article III, and strengthen the patent, trademark,
and copyright regimes so that they fulfill their purposes of rewarding creation with monopolies while growing and safeguarding the public domain.

